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RETROGRESSION IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION:
PRINCIPAL'S LIABILTY AND THE
SUBCONTRACTOR CLAUSE
At the present time forty-one states1 have as a part of their
workmen's compensation legislation a subcontractor clause which
generally imposes statutory liability for the injuries to a subcon-
tractor's employees upon the principal contractor as well as the sub-
contractor. The purposes of the clause were to provide the principal
contractor with an incentive for requiring that his subcontractors
carry insurance, to prevent employer evasion of compensation lia-
bility by subdividing a job among small and irresponsible subcon-
1. All states except California, Delaware, Iowa, New Hampshire, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, West Virginia. 2 Larson, The Law of Workmer's
Compensation [hereinafter Larson] § 72.31 n. 22 (1952) ; 2 Schneider, Work-
men's Compensation [hereinafter Schneider] § 326 n. 3 (1942).
tractors, and, even in the absence of such attempted evasion, to
extend coverage to those employees.2 Thus the goal of "protecting
the worker from a life on a substandard level as the result of a
disabling work injury" 3 will be better achieved.
There is a considerable variation in wording in the several
statutes.4 For example, the terms used to describe the person who
must assume liability for his subcontractor's employee include con-
tractor,5 principal, 6 principal employer 7 and employer. 8 In the re-
mainder of this discussion, however, the normal three parties in-
volved in a problem within the subcontractor statute will be desig-
nated principal, subcontractor, and employee merely to facilitate
treatment of the subject.
In the application of subcontractor clauses, determination of the
limits of that class of persons denoted principal frequently presents
a litigious problem. This Note is intended to investigate these
limits and some of the implications of the principal's liability to
determine whether there has been "progressive judicial enlighten-
ment" in this area to attain the purposes of subcontractor clauses,
and more important, the goal of workmen's compensation legislation.
THE TEcHNICAL CONTRACTOR-SUBcONTRACTOR RELATIONSHIP
Irregardless of the term used to describe the principal, it may
be conceded at the outset that it should not be defined to include
every person who contracts to have work done.'0 For instance, legis-
latures certainly did not intend to make a college liable for acci-
dental injuries suffered by an employee of the contractor who agreed
to repair plumbing in the president's home.1' On the other hand, to
restrict liability under the subcontractor provision to the technical
2. See, e.g., 1 Larson § 49.11; 2 id. § 72.31; 2 Schneider § 326.
3. Riesenfeld, Forty Years of American Workmen's Compensation, 35
Minn. L. Rev. 525, 529 (1951).
4. For a representative survey of subcontractor statutes, see Ferguson,
Liability of Subcontractors Under Workmen's Compensation Laws, 21 Notre
Dame Law. 155 (1946) ; for a state-by-state resume of the specific statutes,
see 2 Schneider §§ 327-377.
5. E.g., N. Y. Workmen's Compensation Law § 56.
6. E. g., Mich. Stat. Ann. § 17.150 (1951).
7. E.g., Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat. § 7423 (1949).
8. E.g., Wis. Stat. § 102.06 (1951).
9. Riesenfeld, supra note 3, at 528.
10. See, e.g., Hudson v. Industrial Comm'n, 241 Wis. 476, 480, 6 N. W.
2d 217, 219 (1942) ; Wells Coal & Dock Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 224 Wis.
546, 548, 272 N. W. 480, 481 (1937) ; see Malone, Principal's Liability for
JVorkmen's Compensation to Employees of Contractor, 10 La. L. Rev. 25, 27
(1949).




contractor-subcontractor relationship 2 seems entirely too stringent.
Here, as throughout the area of legal reasoning, care must be taken
to avoid the pitfall of labeling. Absolving liability merely because the
defendant is called an owner rather than a contractor neglects the
objective of workmen's compensation.
13
If an owner or proprietor delegates to another his normal duties
or sublets work which he is under an obligation to perform, he
should be included within that class of persons termed principal. 14
Three important reasons are apparent in support of this proposition.
First, a proprietor can subdivide his work just as easily as a con-
tractor to avoid workmen's compensation. Second, there is no
additional hardship imposed upon the proprietor because he has
ample opportunity to select responsible subcontractors who will
fully comply with these statutory provisions. Finally, the whole tenor
of workmen's compensation and the judicial interpretation thereof
is to broadly construe this legislation so that the maximum number
of employees may be covered. 15
Cognizance of these reasons very likely prompted many legisla-
tors to use terms less restrictive in connotation than "contractor.1G
Furthermore, some statutes 7 have been drafted to provide specifi-
cally that any person contracting-out or leasing their work or facili-
ties shall be liable under the subcontractor clause, thereby prohibit-
ing a narrow interpretation. Although designed with good purpose,
such statutes may prove to be unwise if they fail to include within
their categorization every person who can by some means evade
the Act.
In Minnesota the statute consists of the usual subcontractor
clause18 and a provision rendering a person liable where a "fraudu-
lent scheme, artifice, or device" to avoid workmen's compensation is
12. Webster's New International Dictionary (unabridged 2d ed. 1947)
defines contractor as "one who formally undertakes to do anything for an-
other," and subcontractor as "[o]ne who contracts with a contractor to per-
form part or all of the latter's contract." Thus, technically, the subcontractor
provision could be construed to be operative only when one person contracts
to perform work for a person already under a contract obligation with
reference to that work.
13. But see, e.g., Evans v. Tabor City Lumber Co., 232 N. C. 111, 59
S. E. 2d 612 (1950).
14. See, e.g., Madison Entertainment Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 211
Wis. 459, 463, 248 N. W. 415, 416 (1933).
15. See, e.g., Moore v. McNulty Co., 171 Minn. 75, 79, 213 N. W. 546,
548 (1927) ; Spanja v. Thibodaux Boiler Works, 2 So. 2d 668, 672 (La. Ct.
App. 1941).
16. Statutes such as those cited in notes 6-8 supra.
17. E.g., Colo. Stat. Ann. c. 97, § 328 (1935).
18. Minn. Stat. § 176.30(4) (1949).
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shown.' When the attempt to evade liability is proved, apparently
the principal will be liable whether he is a contractor, proprietor,
owner, or lessor.2 0 In the absence of a "scheme or device" however,
the combination of provisions 21 seems to have required the person
to be a contractor in the narrow sense to fall within the protection
of the subcontractor statute.22 Seemingly, the reason for this inter-
pretation is that providing liability for "any person" who comes
within the purview of the "scheme or device" section excludes a
broad construction of the term "contractor" employed in the sub-
contractor provision. Thus there is an extension beyond the tech-
nical contractor-subcontractor relationship, but it still appears overly
restrictive in two aspects: it is undoubtedly very difficult to deter-
mine what a "fraudulent scheme or device" is, and, further, to
prove its existence once determined ;23 and the numerous employees
of small and irresponsible subcontractors who have been legitimately
delegated their work by a person not a "contractor" are as yet not
covered by the statute.
T E "BusiNEss OR TRADE" TEST
'Within the outer limits described above, the test to determine
whether the defendant is a principal is: was the work performed
by the subcontractor a part of the trade, business, or occupation of
the principal? Many statutes24 expressly require this before the
subcontractor provision operates, and where not required by
statute it nevertheless appears to be an integral part of judicial
19. Minn. Stat. § 176.30(1) (1949).
20. In the single Minnesota case where a scheme to evade the Act was
found, the defendant was a lessor. Washel v. Tankar Gas, Inc., 211 Minn.
403, 2 N. W. 2d 43 (1941). However, the term used in the "scheme or
device" provision is "any person," which should be broad enough to include
every type of principal.
21. Minn. Stat. § 176.30(1) (1949) ("scheme or device" section) and
Minn. Stat. § 176.30(4) (1949) (subcontractor section).
22. Nylund v. Thornberg, 209 Minn. 79, 295 N. W. 411 (1940) (by im-
plication).
23. Although under a similar Nebraska "scheme or device" statute, Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 44-116 (1952), an agreement by the subcontractor to obviate
the principal's liability and the principal's failure to require the subcon-
tractor to carry insurance was held to be a scheme rendering the principal
liable, Sherlock v. Sherlock, 112 Neb. 797, 201 N. W. 645 (1924), it seems
unlikely that the Minnesota statute will be interpreted as leniently, espe-
cially because only a "scheme" is required by the Nebraska statute com-
pared with a "fraudulent scheme" in the Minnesota statute. See Erickson v.
Kircher, 168 Minn. 67, 209 N. W. 644 (1926).




decisions.2 5 This test is the real crux of the determination; for the
over-all purpose of the statute is to guarantee protection to the sub-
contractor's employees who are performing part of the principal's
business. 26 Moreover, the theory of workmen's compensation is to
shift the cost of injuries to the industry and ultimately to its con-
sumers, 27 and when the injured employee is not engaged in the
business of the principal who is nevertheless liable by statute, the
damages are borne by the wrong industry and the wrong consumers.
One point which practically all courts agree upon is that the
question of whether a particular activity is a part of a principal's
business is usually one of fact,28 and consequently adjudications of
analogous fact situations often bring opposite results.2 9 Opinions
are filled with nebulous terminology attempting to define explicity
the line which separates the business of the principal from functions
not a part of that business: e.g., it must not be merely incidental,
ancilliary, or auxilliary to the business ;30 the subcontractor must
be engaged in the commercial functions of the principal and not
merely afford facilities or casual convenience in carrying on the
business ;31 or, the function the subcontractor has agreed to com-
plete must be necessary to the prosecution of the principal's
primary business.'
2
This linguistic subterfuge achieves only a characterization of any
fact situation. Instead, the extent of the principal's business should
depend on the type of work in question and how it has been treated
by the principal. The most decisive test in this regard is whether
or not the activity is ordinarily and customarily done by the prin-
25. See, e.g., Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Vaughan, 200 Okla. 226,
192 P. 2d 639 (1948) ; Great A. & P. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 205 Wis. 7,
236 N. W. 575 (1931).
26. See note 2 .rupra.
27. 1 Larson § 1.00.
28. See, e.g., Johnson v. Robertson Bleachery & Dye Works, Inc., 136
Conn. 698, 704, 74 A. 2d 196, 199 (1950) ; Dubois v. Soule Mill, 323 Mass.
472, 476, 82 N. E. 2d 886, 888 (1948).
29. Compare Burt v. Munising Woodenware Co., 222 Mich. 699, 193
N. W. 895 (1923) (repairing boiler part of utensil manufacturer's business),
with Wells Coal & Dock Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 224 Wis. 546, 272 N. W.
480 (1937) (repairing boiler not part of coal and building materials dealer's
business). Compare Fox v. Fafnir Bearing Co., 107 Conn. 189, 139 Atl. 778
(1928) (plant window washing part of manufacturer's business), with
American Radiator Co. v. Franzen, 81 Colo. 161, 254 Pac. 160 (1927) (plant
window washing iwt part of manufacturer's business).
30. See, e.g., Cummings v. Union Quarry & Const. Co., 231 Mo. App.
1224, 1228-1229, 87 S. W. 2d 1039, 1041 (1935).
31. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Wallace, 172 F. 2d 802, 809 (4th
Cir. 1949); Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 407 Ill.
360, 372, 95 N. E. 2d 482, 489 (1950).
32. See Truhlicka v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 162 Kan. 535, 542, 178
P. 2d 252, 258 (1947)..
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cipal. 33 This would seem to involve a consideration of the principal's
past and present practices and the practices in similar businesses, 3'
because this indicates what the principal has actually considered a
part of his business. The regularity of the work in question is an-
other factor to consider, since it has been held that special con-
struction and usual repairs are not a part of a manufacturer's busi-
ness.35 In addition, the specialization of the activity ought to be
considered, investigating whether this principal has employees with
the same training and ability and how well both the principal and
the subcontractor are equipped to perform the work.36 Any one of
these factors should not be an ultimate criterion, but it is not intended
that this be an all-inclusive list of such factors. However, in each
case these factors, its particular fact situation, and any other factors
peculiar thereto should all be carefully examined to decide whether
the activity is a part of the business of the principal.
RESTRICTIONS ON THE APPLICABILITY OF SUBCONTRACTOR CLAUSES
"Premises" test. Although the "business or trade" test is un-
doubtedly the most significant, in a few states the principal is liable
only if the employee is injured on or at the principal's premises- . or
a place over which the principal has control.3s This restriction is
probably attributable to the legislative belief that to constitutionality
attach this statutory liability here must be a possibiliy of control
by the principal over the employee.39 The evident fallacy is that
the right to control is not the pivotal test for determining liability
under a subcontractor statute as it is in deciding whether a person
is an independent contractor or an employee,40 and that control of
the employee by the principal is not feasible when the subcontractor
is his immediate and controlling employer. In addition, application
33. See, e.g., Crisanti v. Cremo Brewing Co., 136 Conn. 529, 532, 72
A. 2d 655, 657 (1950); Cannon v. Crowley, 318 Mass. 373, 375, 61 N. E.
2d 662, 664 (1945) ; see 1 Larson § 49.12.
34. See 1 Larson § 49.00; Malone, supra note 10, at 40.
35. Bown v. Waterbury Battery Co.. 129 Conn. 44, 26 A. 2d 467 (1942) ;
Horrell v. Gulf & Valley Cotton Oil Co., 131 So. 709 (La. Ct App. 1930).
36. See Atlas Powder Co. v. Hanson, 136 F. 2d 444 (8th Cir. 1943) ;
Britton v. Industrial Comm'n, 248 Wis. 549, 22 N. W. 2d 525 (1946) ; Hudson
v. Industrial Comm'n, 241 Wis. 476, 6 N. W. 2d 217 (1942).
37. E.g., Minn. Stat. § 176.30(4) (1949).
38. E.g., Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 44-503 (Corrick 1949); Mass. Ann.
Laws c. 152, § 18 (1949).
39. See D'Alessandro v. Barfield, 348 Pa. 328, 332-334, 35 A. 2d 412,
413-414 (1944).
40. It has been said that even in the independent contractor-employee
situation, a test similar to the "trade or business" test, termed the "relative-
nature-of-the-work" test, is tending to replace the right to control concept.
See 1 Larson § 45.00 et seq.
1953]
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of the "premises" test often forces the courts to such absurd posi-
tions as extending a seed jobber's premises to include a customer's
dock several miles away where the employee of a trucking sub-
contractor was making a delivery.
41
Evasion by sales and leasing. Scheming principals were not com-
pletely halted by the subcontractor provision in their attempts
to evade workmen's compensation. Other fictions are also used,
the most important of which are leases and sales contracts. The
lumber industry is a frequent source for sales arrangements42 where-
by the lumber company will purchase stumpage rights from the
landowner and then make a bill of sale to a cutter who agrees to
resell the cut product to the lumber company at a certain higher
price; in effect the price difference is only the cutter's wages plus
any wages he must pay to his employees. That these middlemen are
often financially unstable and their employees' remedies in work-
men's compensation of little avail is shown by the fact that the sale
is financed completely by the lumber company and gradually re-
duced as the lumber is delivered.4 3 There is little difference between
this arrangement and an ordinary principal-subcontractor relation-
ship and in some extreme cases courts have so held.44 On the other
hand, if the sale is bona fide, no contractual relation sufficient to
bring the parties within the statute exists, 45 and consequently,
many employees in this area are not properly protected.
4
6
Minimum employees required. It appears obvious that the sub-
contractor statute should operate even though the subcontractor
41. Swift v. Kelso Feed Co., 161 Kan. 383, 168 P. 2d 512 (1946) ; see
also Lee v. McMinn Industries, Inc., 167 Pa. Super. 501, 76 A. 2d 493 (1950).
In the Swift case, it was argued in the dissenting opinion that this decision
will necessarily subject all retailers and wholesalers who contract-out their
deliveries to liability in workmen's compensation for injuries suffered by the
employee-truck drivers. Swift v. Kelso Feed Co., supra at 397, 168 P. 2d at
521. But today merchants commonly offer delivery as an integral part of their
sales promotion, especially on the retail level, and thus it seems that in many
cases such entrepreneurs should be deemed principals. This problem is
significant because transportation is one of the functions in which the ques-
tion of the principal's liability arises most frequently. See 1 Larson § 49.12.
42. See Malone, supra note 10, at 29.
43. See, for instance, Hobbs-Western Co. v. Craig, 209 Ark. 630, 192
S. W. 2d 116 (1946).
44. Ibid; Heyman v. Volkman, 326 Mich. 179, 40 N. W. 2d 110 (1949).
45. See, e.g., Evans v. Tabor City Lumber Co., 232 N. C. 111, 59 S. E.
2d 612 (1950) ; Grant v. Consolidated Underwriters, 33 So. 2d 575 (La. Ct.
App. 1947) ; Windhain v. Newport Co., 143 So. 538 (La. Ct. App. 1932).
46. A similar attempt to evade workmen's compensation may be facili-
tated through the owner's leasing of all or part of his business to uninsured
lessees. See Washel v. Tankar Gas, Inc., 211 Minn. 403, 2 N. W. 2d 43 (1941).
The possibility of such a situation apparently induced one state to expressly
include lessors as principals in the subcontractor provision. Colo. Stat. Ann. c.
79, § 328 (1935).
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does not employ the statutory number of employees if the em-
ployees of the subcontractor and principal together total the statu-
tory number.4 7 Otherwise, by subdividing his work among small
enough subcontractors it would be possible for the principal to
evade the Act, exactly contrary to the purpose of the subcontractor
clause. 4 8 Yet two jurisdictions have refused to impose liability in
that case.4 Likewise, a principal previously not covered by the
provision should be within it when he begins business by sub-
dividing all the work, such as an owner constructing for profit
a building on his land by subcontracting the total construction. 0
When the principal's work is subdivided among subcontractors
who do the work personally but comprise the required number
of employees, it would seem that they should be considered em-
ployees of the principal,"' even though a subcontractor employing
the requisite number of employees may not be covered. 52 The sub-
contractor without the minimum employees is generally only a small
operator not financially better off than the principal's employees.
Series of subcontractors. When the case involves not only a
principal and subcontractor but also contractors under the sub-
contractor, the principal assumes the same liability to the employees
of both the immediate and remote subcontractors, while the pre-
ceding subcontractors are also liable as principals. 5' This conclusion
47. E.g., N. C. Gen. Stat. § 97-19 (1950); Maxwell v. Beck, 169 Tenn.
315, 87 S. W. 2d 564 (1935).
48. See note 2 supra. This problem will probably occur infrequently
because the minimum number of employees is very small; of the thirty-one
jurisdictions which require a certain number of employees, twenty-three re-
quire from two to five, though the minimum is fifteen in South Carolina.
Minnesota does not have a statutory minimum. See Riesenfeld & Maxwell,
Modern Social Legislation, 185 and n. 2 (1950).
49. McDuffie v. Nash Neon Sign Co., 202 Okla. 568, 215 P. 2d 839
(1949) ; see Industrial Comm'n v. Everett, 108 Ohio St. 369, 375, 140 N. E.
767, 769 (1923).
50. See Seabury v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp. 171 La. 199, 204, 130
So. 1, 3 (1930). Contra: Dewhurst v. Simon, 295 N. Y. 352, 67 N. E. 2d
578 (1946). The Dewlurst case involved a subcontractor statute using the
term "contractor," N. Y. Workmen's Compensation Law § 56, and this
court construed the term. See also Tex. Stat., Rev. Civ. art 8307, § 6 (1948),
which uses the word "subscriber" in the subcontractor statute, thus pre-
cluding coverage of a person going into business and not previously a sub-
scriber.
51. 1 Larson § 45.10.
52. E.g., Hayes v. Board of Trustees, 224 N. C. 11, 29 S. E. 2d 137
(1944); McDowell v. Stilley Plywood Co., 210 S. C. 173, 41 S. E. 2d 872
(1947). Contra: Simpson v. New Madrid Stave Co., 227 Mo. App. 331, 52
S. W. 615 (1932).
53. S. C. Code § 72-113 (1952) ; Va. Code § 65-28 (1950) ; see Baker
& Conrad, Inc. v. Chicago Heights Const. Co., 364 Ill. 386, 394-398, 4 N. E.
2d 953, 957-959 (1936) ; McVeigh v. Brewer, 182 Tenn. 683, 695, 189 S. W.
2d 812, 817 (1945).
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is supported by the same reasons that justify the principal's liability
for the subcontractor's employees.5 4
Insurer's insolvency. Consistency would also require that a sub-
contractor's employees should not be in a better position than the
principal's own employees merely because of the subcontractor
statute. For example, if a subcontractor carries workmen's com-
pensation insurance, his injured employee's rights under the Act
ought not to extend to the principal if some other event, such as the
insurer's insolvency, occurs which deprives the employee of his
recovery.55
THE SUBCONTRACTOR CLAUSE AND THE PRINCIPAL'S COMtON
LAW LIABILITY
Although workmen's compensation is ordinarily an exclusive
remedy,56 provision is usually made for the injured employee or
his subrogee to bring a common law action against a third party
whose negligence contributed to the injury. 7 Only in the state of
Washington" does the statute exempt from common law liability
as third parties all persons who participate in the workmen's
compensation plan.59 It has been vigorously argued that this is the
most equitable conclusion because all parties have been absolved
of certain inherent risks and have received definite advantages, part
of which is the exclusionary characteristic of this legislation. 0
Where there is no express provision, the liability of a principal
as a third party depends on judicial interpretation of the effect of the
subcontractor clause. It should be noted that in this area the "busi-
ness or trade" test is again very significant, for if the activity of the
injured employee was not a part of the business, trade, or occupation
of the principal, the principal is not within the subcontractor pro-
vision and thus is usually a suable third party."' The only difference
"54. See note 2 supra.
55. Sciachitano v. Spencer Forbes, Inc., 264 N. Y. 324, 190 N. E. 656
(1934).
56. E.g., Minn. Stat. § 176.04 (1949); 2 Larson § 65.10.
57. E.g, Minn. Stat. § 176.06 (1949) ; 2 Larson §3 71.10-71.30.
58. Wash. Rev. Code § 51.24.010 (1951). Illinois has a similar statute,
Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 48, § 166 (1950), but it was recently declared unconstitu-
tional on the ground that it provided a purely arbitrary classification of
immune parties. Grasse v. Dealer's Transp. Co., 412 Ill. 179, 106 N. E. 2d
124, cert. denied, 344 U. S. 837 (1952). Regarding the validity of the Wash-
ington statute, see Denning v. Quist, 160 Wash. 681, 296 Pac. 145 (1931).
59. The Washington statute does provide for recovery of the compensa-
tion award from the ultimate wrongdoer. Wash. Rev. Code § 51.24.010 (1951).
60. See 2 Larson § 72.50.
61. Settle v. Baldwin, 355 Mo. 336, 196 S. W. 2d 299 (1946) ; Perrin
v. American Theatrical Co., 352 Mo. 484, 178 S. W. 2d 332 (1944) ; Allen
v. Babcock & Wilson Tube Co., 356 Pa. 414, 52 A. 2d 314 (1947); see
[Vol. 37:368
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is that now the principal rather than the employee is asserting that
the work is a part of his business, and he bears the burden of proof
of that allegation.62 Courts may in this situation be tempted to re-
strict the area encompassed by the trade or business of the principal
to afford a larger recovery to the employee,6 3 but if the Act is to
be liberally construed to grant the widest coverage when workmen's
compensation recovery is in issue, to be logically and justly con-
sistent, the same interpretation must apply to a common law suit.64
To some extent, of course, this problem is tied to the type of
liability imposed upon the principal.65 Thus if he is primarily liable,
he should not be deemed a third party because the employee of the
subcontractor can, if he desires, initially proceed against the prin-
cipal for workmen's compensation.66 Similarly, when the sub-
contractor is uninsured and the principal therefore rendered liable
even though his liability is secondary, it has been restricted to that
provided by statute.67 On the other hand, some jurisdictions hold
that a principal is a third party amenable to suit regardless of
the circumstances, 68 asserting that the only basis for the exclusive-
ness of the workmen's compensation remedy is the existence of an
actual employer-employee relationship. 9 This conclusion appears
both illogical and unwarranted, and it seems that the principal
who is covered by the subcontractor provision should be relieved
of all common law liability to the subcontractor's employees whether
Greenwald v. Wire Rope Corp., 131 Conn. 465, 466, 40 A. 2d 748, 749 (1944).
62. See Johnson v. Robertson Bleachery & Dye Works, Inc., 136 Conn.
698, 704, 74 A. 2d 196, 199 (1950).
63. See, e.g., Stratis v. McLellan Stores Co., 311 Mass. 525, 536, 42
N. E. 2d 282, 288 (1942), where it was held that running a lunch-counter was
not a part of a department store's business but rather it was "conduct[ing]
a business within a business."
64. See Thibodaux v. Sun Oil Co., 40 So. 2d 761, 766 (La. Ct. App.
1949), aff'd, 218 La. 435, 49 So. 2d 852 (1950).
65. The statutes provide various types of liability for the principal: he
may be jointly liable, primarily liable, secondarily liable, liable if he fails to
obtain a certificate showing the subcontractor's insured position, or liable
where a fraudulent scheme, artifice or device to evade workmen's com-
pensation is shown. See 2 Schneider § 326. The Minnesota statute imposes
liability where a fraudulent scheme, artific, or device is shown, Minn. Stat.
§ 176.30(1) (1949), and imposes secondary liability under the subcontractor
statute. Minn. Stat. § 176.30(4) (1949).
66. E.g., Bogoratt v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Co., 114 Conn. 126, 157
Atl. 860 (1932).
67. Marchbanks v. Duke Power Co., 190 S. C. 336, 2 S. E. 2d 825
(1939).
68. Sweezey v. Arc Elec. Const. Co., 295 N. Y. 306, 67 N. E. 2d 369
(1946) ; Culbertson v. Kieckhefer Container Co., 197 Wis. 349, 222 N. W.
249 (1928).
69. See Sweezey v. Arc Elec. Const. Co., sipra note 68, at 310-312,
67 N. E. 2d at 370-371.
1953]
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the subcontractor is insured or not,7 0 although this is contrary to
the majority view. 71 The advantages secured to these employees by
the subcontractor clause at the principal's expense-a statutory
right of action against not one but two employers-not only out-
weighs the infrequent advantage attendant to a tort action against
the principal7 2 but in addition should require that the employee
forsake his common law remedy in exchange therefor. It was not
the purpose of the legislation to place a greater burden upon the
principal for injuries to the subcontractor's employees than for the
injuries suffered by his own employees.
73
The Minnesota statute74 bearing on third-party tort liability is
noted for its uniqueness.75 In effect, it provides that an injured em-
ployee may elect between proceeding against his employer for
compensation or against a third person in- a tort action, but not
against both if both are either insured or self-insured and ". . . en-
gaged in the due course of business, (a) in furtherance of a common
enterprise, or (b) the accomplishment of the same or related pur-
poses in operation on the premises where the injury was received
at the time thereof .... " However, the recovery by the employee or
his subrogee70 in the legal action is restricted to the amount pro-
vided by workmen's compensation .7 7 Basically then, this is a restric-
tion of recovery rather than immunity from common law liability.
Where the "common enterprise" or "related purposes" tests do not
apply,78 another provision of the Minnesota statute7 0 states ex-
pressly that the employee may proceed against the third party in
tort, and recovery is not restricted by the Act. Thus a subcon-
70. See Brickley v. Gulf Coast Const. Co., 153 Fla. 216, 14 So. 265
(1943); Sykes v. Stone & Webster Eng. Corp., 186 Va. 116, 41 S. E. 469
(1947).
71. E.g., Anderson v. Sanderson & Porter, 146 F. 2d 58 (8th Cir. 1945);
Trumbull Cliffs Furnance Co. v. Sbachovsky, 111 Ohio St. 791, 146 N. E.
306 (1924) ; see 2 Larson § 72.31.
72. See Gifford v. Nottingham, 68 Idaho 330, 339, 193 P. 2d 831, 836
(1948).
73. See, e.g., Bindbeutel v. Willcutt & Sons Co., 244 Mass. 195, 198,
138 N. E. 239, 240 (1923).
74. Minn. Stat. § 176.06(1) (1949).
75. See Volding v. Harnish, 51 N. W. 2d 658, 662 (Minn. 1952) ; see
27 Minn. L. Rev. 585, 586 (1943) ; 20 Minn. L. Rev. 323, 324 (1936) ; 15
Minn. L. Rev. 257, 258 (1931). Massachusetts has developed a similar though
perhaps not as broad doctrine through case law. See 2 Larson §§ 72.32-72.34.
76. If the employee should elect to receive compensation, his rights
against the third-party tortfeasor are subrogated to the employer. Minn.
Stat. § 176.06(1) (1949).
77. Costs and reasonable attorney's fees may also be recovered. Minn.
Stat. § 176.06(1) (1949).
78. Or where the third party is not insured or self-insured.
79. Minn. Stat. § 176.06(2) (1949).
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tractor's employee may be able to bring a legal action against the
principal with recovery unlimited if the respective activities do not
comply with the "common enterprise" or "related purposes" tests."0
Obviously terms such as "common enterprise" and "related
purposes" are at best vague and indefinite, and in the words of the
Minnesota Supreme Court, the statute "has given rise to 'endless
and fruitless litigation.' "81 It has been indicated that this statute
applies to situations involving subcontractors and contractors,8 2
but the apparent requirement that the employer and the third party
be mutually engaged has received destructive criticism, because it
was felt that the purpose of the "common enterprise" test was to
enlarge the employee's common law right of action ;83 consequently
the section has been interpreted to apply only where the employees
-not the employer and the third person-are engaged in a common
activity and thus exposes to mutual hazards.8 4 This test, aptly
termed the "relativity of hazards" test, is not unquestionable.8 5 It
would seem that the court has taken a conceptualistic approach to
the interpretation of the statute: the legislature first took away the
80. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Frechette, 161 F. 2d 318 (8th
Cir. 1947) (applying Minnesota law).
81. Swanson v. J. L. Shiely Co., 234 Minn. 548, 553-554, 48 N. W. 2d
848, 852 (1951). Little assistance may be derived from the numerous cases in-
volving the "common enterprise" and "related purposes" test. Comparable fact
situations have brought opposite results. Compare Rasmussen v. George Benz
& Sons, 168 Minn. 319, 210 N .W. 75 (1926), with Horgen v. Franklin Co-op.
Creamery Ass'n, 195 Minn. 159, 262 N. W. 149 (1935). The more recent
cases indicate a reluctance to find a "common enterprise" or "related pur-
poses." See Manteuffel v. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co., 56 N. W. 2d 310
(Minn. 1952); Swanson v. J. L. Shiely Co., 234 Minn. 548, 48 N. W. 2d
848 (1951); Johnson v. Duluth, 216 Mim. 192, 12 N. W. 2d 192 (1943);
Gleason v. Geary, 214 Minn. 499, 8 N. W. 2d 808 (1943). But see Volding v.
Harnish, 51 N. W. 2d 658 (Minn. 1952). In one case, Anderson v. Interstate
Power Co., 195 Minn. 528, 532, 263 N. W. 612, 614 (1935), the court
specified that the "supplying of a necessary product, ... does not create
the relationship of a common enterprise."
82. See, e.g., Gleason v. Geary, 214 Minn. 499, 508, 8 N. W. 2d 808,
812-813 (1943), 27 Minn. L. Rev. 585.
83. See Swanson v. J. L. Shiely Co., 234 Minn. 548, 556-558, 48 N. W.
2d 848, 852-854 (1951); Gleason v. Geary, 214 Minn. 499, 508-511, 8 N. W.
2d 808, 812-814 (1943); Gentle v. Northern States Power Co., 213 Minn.
231, 237-238, 6 N. W. 2d 361, 364 (1942) (concurring opinion). The "common
enterprise" and "related purposes" restriction was enacted in 1923. Minn. Laws
1923, c. 279, § 1(1). An Interim Commission Report suggested the amend-
ment without elaborating upon its reasons or purposes. Minn. H. R. Interim
Comm'n Rep., Minn. Industrial Comm'n 1st Bienn. Rep. 117, 126 (1923).
84. See Voiding v. Harnish, 51 N. W. 2d 658, 662 (Minn. 1952); Swan-
son v. J. L. Shiely Co., 234 Minn. 548, 556-558, 48 N. W. 2d 848, 852-854
(1951) ; Gleason v. Geary, 214 Minn. 499, 508-511, 8 N. W. 2d 808, 812--814
(1943); Gentle v. Northern States Power Co., 213 Minn. 231, 237-238, 6
N. W. 2d 361, 364 (1942) (concurring opinion).
85. See E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Frechette, 161 F. 2d 318,
322 (8th Cir. 1947).
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employee's common law action and by a 1923 amendment"" intended
to replace this right within a broad area; therefore it must be
construed to broaden the common law rights. But it is just as
likely that the legislature was primarily interested in adjusting the
number of insured third parties benefited by the liability restriction
s6 that the industry which bears the compensation loss is more
related to the employee who suffers the injury. And certainly the
express words of the statute support this viewpoint.
Even if so construed, the legislation seems to have accomplished
only two things. First, when there is any possible question as to
whether or not the activities are a part of a "common enterprise"
or are of "related purposes," it is practically a guarantor of litiga-
tion. This is in contravention to the policy of expeditious and in-
expensive protection of the employee envisaged by the proponents
of workmen's compensation in Minnesota.8 7 Secondly, if there is no
question that the employee is within the common activity, the statute
provides nothing more than a subrogation right to the employer who
has paid compensation ;ss for surely the employee will not render
himself susceptible to the common law defenses of contributory
negligence89 and assumption of risk in a negligence action against
a third party when he is assured recovery through his statutory
remedy.
Three legislative alternatives are apparent to remedy this prob-
lem. First, liability could be restricted to the amount provided by
the Act for all those insured under the workmen's compensation
plan, with the insured third-party tortfeasor merely liable for the
amount of compensation payable by the immediate employer to the
injured employee.90 This would have the additional advantage of
obviating many of the multifarious and complex problems of con-
tribution and indemnity arising between employer and third party,9'
but it may be susceptible to being declared unconstitutional. 2 This
86. Minn. Laws 1923, c. 279, § 1(1), now in the final paragraph of
Minn. Stat. 176.06(1) (1949).
87. Rep. Minn. Employees' Compensation Conm'n 162-163 (1911).
88. See note 76 supra.
89. For discussion of whose contributory negligence is available to the
third party as a defense, see 36 Minn. L. Rev. 549 (1952).
90. The argument asserted to support this proposal is that relinquish-
ing the common law action against insured third parties should be part of the
quid pro quo which the employees must tender in exchange for their com-
pensation remedy. See 2 Larson § 72.50. This would be reverting to the
pre-1923 Minnesota statute. See Minn. Laws 1921, c. 82, § 31 (1).
91. See 36 Minn. L. Rev. 549 (1952).
92. Compare Grasse v. Dealer's Transp. Co., 412 Ill. 179, 106 N. E.
2d 124, cert. denied, 344 U. S. 837 (1952) (unconstitutional), with Denning
v. Quist, 160 Wash. 681, 296 Pac. 145 (1931) (valid). The constitutionality of
such a provision would appear to be settled in Minnesota. See Mathison v.
Minneapolis Street Ry., 126 Minn. 286, 148 N. W. 71 (1914).
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broad restriction of liability has the same deficiency as that existent
in the "common enterprise" test: there is no direct relationship
between the injured employee and the third-party tortfeasor, although
in a common enterprise the industrial relation of the two employers
may be stabilized by a limitation of liability. The second alternative
would be to redraft the present statute, defining explicitly what is
meant by "common enterprise" and "related purposes" in terms
of employers, thereby guaranteeing protection from tort liability
at least to one who is principal within the subcontractor clause.
The last alternative, and the one which would be in line with the
purpose of enlarging the employee's common law rights of action,
9 3
would be to apply the restriction of liability only to principals who
are within the subcontractor statute. This test would not only be
more certain, but would grant limited liability where the third-party
has a direct relationship with the employee, unlike the third-parties
benefited by the previous alternatives.
CONCLUSION
Subcontractor statutes generally have not been skillfully drafted
in view of the objective which they were intended to achieve. More-
over, courts have not been prone to eliminate these deficiencies.
Certainly the coverage of workmen's compensation should be as
broad as possible to remedy injuries inherent in an industrial
economy, but conversely, as the coverage is broadened--especially
in the liability of principals-it seems only fair and logical that the
tort liability of those that may be liable for compensation should
be narrowed.
93. See note 83 supra.
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